One of the most basic requirements for a free and fair election is the availability of the voters’ roll to political candidates. This is to enable them to reach out to voters and secure their confidence in a forthcoming election. In Zimbabwe, the law provides for this but it does not get followed.
Last Monday, the Zimbabwe high court decided that presidential candidate Nelson Chamisa’s Citizens’ Coalition for Change (CCC) should wait until after the elections before it can argue to get access to the voters’ roll. The elections take place next week.
I could list a litany of examples that show why, once more, Zimbabwe’s elections are compromised before they even begin.
Zanu-PF has been in power since 1980. Over the decades, it has reshaped and contorted Zimbabwe in its undemocratic and corrupt image, including its judiciary. It is not unheard of for lawyers representing opponents of the governing party to be arrested while the courts deliberately vacillate to give effect to the political persecution.
The Zimbabwe Emmerson Mnangagwa wrested from Robert Mugabe, another inglorious hero of Zimbabwe’s struggle, is a ruin. Many of its best citizens live abroad, mostly in South Africa. They have run away from economic hardship occasioned by corruption, political arrogance and incompetence. Should they dare challenge the status quo, they are likely to be arrested.
Here in South Africa they have been the subject of intense political discussion for years. Occasionally, that discussion has spilled over into violence as locals, also living in desperate circumstances, violently attack African immigrants to evict them from their communities. It is a pitiful existence that has carried on for far too long.
Next week’s elections are yet another chance for Zimbabwe to correct its course but a correction remains in serious doubt.
First, it is not possible to reform Zanu-PF. Its leadership no longer has a single democratic bone in its body. The culture of the organisation has metastasised around de facto one party rule, patronage and corruption. It controls the broadcast and print media, while it is permanently unsafe to be an independent journalist in that country.
This manner of rule distorts the fundamental requirements of an effective democracy, which is that citizens have access to sufficient, accurate information, and unhindered critical analysis thereof. This is so that citizens can make informed political choices at election time. Not only does the party rely on keeping voters as uncritical and uninformed as possible, it has also lost the ability and patience to argue its way into the hearts of voters.
Its response to arguments to which it cannot respond effectively has been to use state and supporter violence against those who articulate what is wrong and how to fix it.
Second, there is a real possibility of violence, regardless of outcome, although the nature and intensity of the violence will depend on who is declared winner. Should Mnangagwa emerge the winner, that outcome will be discredited due to the reasons I have outlined above, and more.
In the event that the opposition wins, which would be a miracle if historical trends are taken into account, there remains the great possibility that the state machinery will be unleashed against opponents of the government.
Zimbabwe is a lesson in what happens when a party of liberation stays in power for too long along with its fossilised leadership that is no longer able to appreciate the vastly changed world for what it is. They also lose the ability to connect with the majority of citizens, who tend to be much younger.
Notwithstanding the odds stacked against a democratic outcome next week, its realisation could signal an important milestone for the region, for it would be yet another example of old politics and politicians having to step aside for new leadership. Outmoded thinking and intellectually dilapidated political institutions hold many post-liberation countries back in a context of rapid global change.
That said, even an opposition victory in Zimbabwe does not guarantee success in the future. It needs strong, visionary leadership characterised by a willingness to ruthlessly reform long-captured institutions. This will be difficult because the police, the army and the courts are heavily politicised. The very senior ranks of the civil service are but a wing of Zanu-PF, so it is nearly impossible to institute reforms without a significant purge thereof.
In some ways, this is the same dilemma that faced the ANC when it took over the government in 1994, a process that was helped along by the relative willingness of the apartheid state’s senior public servants to get out of the way. Many had options in the economy or to flee overseas. In Zimbabwe, it is likely to be far different. There is not much of an economy to speak of and going overseas is an option that is unavailable to most.
In addition, attached to Zanu-PF politicians and senior civil servants is a vast patronage network that will feel deprived if those same people are not in charge. This means even if a new government were inclined, as it should be, to institute deep reforms and change in leadership, there will be far greater resistance than that from mere individuals who are losing their jobs.
It is this existential threat to the interests of this Zanu-PF patronage system network that will fuel instability. Any system that has been entrenched for such a long time usually has an array of stakeholder interests who will not give up their positions and privileges easily. They will do whatever they can to undermine any meaningful reforms.
It will be interesting to see how the South African government, the Southern African Development Community and the African Union respond to developments in Zimbabwe. Previously, all three have engaged in various versions of looking the other way, perpetuating a crisis that has continued to have political ramifications across the region.
In short, the question is whether these bodies will once again side with an old, tired regime of corrupt old men and their cronies or finally stick to democratic principles and call out any unfair actions leading up to, and during, these elections.
The signs are not good. Withholding the voters’ roll for no particular reason, arresting political opponents on trumped-up charges and denying them space to campaign have tainted the elections even before they begin. Their collective muted response is a strong indication that there is unlikely to be a departure from previous elections where they chose not to see, hear or know.
If there are any lessons for South Africa to learn from Zimbabwe, it is that long periods of incumbency breed arrogance, corruption and cronyism. It is also that when the educated flee to other countries or withdraw from politics, such as is happening in South Africa, a dangerous vacuum is created where the very system they despise gets entrenched unhindered, making recovery far more difficult in the future.
The close political contest in the upcoming Zimbabwe elections provides the kind of democratic tension South Africa so sorely lacks. Next year provides an opportunity for South Africa to, for once, emulate Zimbabwe — in a good way.
Songezo Zibi is the leader of a new political party, Rise Mzansi.
